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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite considerable controversy concerning the size of the fed-
eral bureaucracy,' proposals continue to be advanced in Congress
* Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission; A.B., Prince-
ton University, 1966; J.D., Columbia University, 1969.
** Staff Attorney, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission; A.B., Trinity
College, 1973; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1977.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessar-
ily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or those of the staff of its Bureau of
Competition.
1. See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & Womw REP., Oct. 3, 1977, at 22.
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and elsewhere to deal with the nation's economic and social prob-
lems by creating new federal agencies, armed with flexible adminis-
trative sanctions and broad substantive mandates,2 or by adding to
the arsenals of existing federal agencies.3 Most, if not all, of these
proposals are based on the federal commerce power.4 Furthermore,
they are fostered in part by the judicial imprimatur the Supreme
Court has placed on Congress' use of the commerce power to regu-
late conduct that is only tenuously related to interstate commerce. 5
Congress' continued pattern of providing federal statutory solu-
tions for what previously were thought to be local problems raises
questions about the proper relationship between rules and regula-
tions promulgated by federal agencies and the prerogatives of state
legislatures. Constitutional analysis is central to the relationship,
since agency regulations are issued pursuant to a valid congressional
exercise of commerce clause authority, and state sovereignty also is
recognized implicitly in the Constitution's fabric, as well as expli-
citly in the tenth amendment.' Framed in more precise legal terms,
the question is whether rules and regulations of federal agencies that
implement congressional economic regulatory policies can invali-
date or preempt state policies reflecting sovereign state regulatory
goals that are not entirely consistent with Congress' scheme.
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") and
its enabling legislation, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 19147
("FTC Act"), provide an excellent opportunity to explore these is-
2. See, e.g., Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565
(1977); S. 1685, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to create a Department of Education and
Training); H.R. 9718, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to create a federal consumer protection
agency).
3. See, e.g., H.R. 3816, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to amend the Federal Trade
Commission Act); H.R. 106, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (to amend the Interstate Commerce
Commission Act to strengthen motor carriers' safety standards); H.R. 77, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (to amend the National Labor Relations Act).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
5. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976). Section 5 of the 1914 Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat.
717 (1914), only prohibited "unfair methods of competition." The Supreme Court subse-
quently held in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), that this phrase was limited solely
to conduct injurious to competition. Congress responded with the Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L.
No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), which added to § 5 the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," and thereby empowered the FTC to prevent trade practices injurious to both
competitors and consumers.
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sues. The Commission is one of the original federal agencies created
by Congress pursuant to its commerce power. The federal economic
policies administered by the FTC find their genesis in the antitrust
laws,8 which represent the fullest use of congressional commerce
authority to impose a national economic regulatory regime.' The
hallmark of this regime, however, is not economic regulation by
governmental fiat, but rather governmental reliance on the natural
self-regulatory forces of a free competitive market unhampered by
private anticompetitive trade restraints.
Using the FTC to explore the relationship between federal and
state regulation of local commerce is all the more relevant because
the Commission is currently embarking upon an aggressive cam-
paign to prohibit, through a series of trade regulation rules, anti-
competitive conduct that has little, if any, economic justification,
but that nevertheless either is condoned, encouraged, or actually
administered by state governments."0 In addition, Congress recently
has expanded the Commission's enforcement authority by enacting
the 1975 Magnuson-Moss amendments to the FTC Act," which ex-
tend the FTC's commerce jurisdiction to include unfair trade prac-
tices that merely affect interstate commerce 2 and also confirm the
Commission's substantive rulemaking authority to define conduct
constituting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" violative of sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act.13
8. The antitrust laws include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-22, 44 (1976) as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a)-(d) (1976). The FTC has jurisdiction to enforce the Clayton Act and the FTC Act.
Since the FTC Act was enacted to supplement the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it has been
construed to include acts or practices that violate the spirit if not the letter of the antitrust
laws. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
9. United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 278 (1975).
10. See, e.g., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,198 (1978) (state regulation of legal
services), 10,190 (1977) (state milk price regulation), 10,188 (1977) (restrictions on health
maintenance organizations), 10,174 (1977) (state regulation of Blue Shield Plans), 10,186
(1977) (state regulation of accountants), 10,162 (1976) (eyeglass advertising restrictions),
10,169 (1976) (real estate brokerage regulation).
11. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57a-57c, 2301-12 (1976)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). Prior to amendment of the FTC Act, its jurisdiction was
limited to unfair trade practices "in commerce." The change of an "affecting commerce"
standard effected by the Maguuson-Moss Act was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), in which the "in
commerce" jurisdictional reach of § 7 of the Clayton Act was found to be more limited than
that of the Sherman Act. The "affecting commerce" language therefore was chosen to give
the FTC Act the same broad reach that Congress gave the Sherman Act.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1976) provides that the Commission may prescribe "rules
which define with specificity acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning
of section 45(a)(1) of this title). Rules under this subparagraph may include requirements
prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices." This grant of rulemaking
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While the Commission was preparing this attack upon state-
sanctioned anticompetitive conduct, however, the Supreme Court
unanimously held in Bates v. State Bar 4 that the antitrust laws do
not apply to sovereign state regulatory conduct. The Court recently
reaffirmed this holding in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.5 Moreover, the same Supreme Court that decided Bates
and City of Lafayette suggested only one year earlier in National
League of Cities v. Usery5 that even Congress' exercise of its com-
merce clause authority may be limited from interfering with certain
sovereign state policy decisions that affect interstate commerce.
This Article examines in detail the policies underlying these
recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sherman Act and
shows that they have equal applicability to FTC enforcement of the
Clayton and FTC Acts. The Article identifies the factual criteria
used by the courts for distinguishing state and private conduct that
is subject to the antitrust laws, and to congressional commerce dic-
tates, from sovereign state regulatory conduct that is immune from
antitrust sanction. The Article then focuses on the impact of Usery,
which provides constitutional support for the so-called state action
doctrine that was originated in Parker v. Brown.17 Finally, we con-
clude that the state action doctrine is not limited to the confines of
the Sherman, Clayton, or FTC Acts but may well stand as a consti-
tutional limitation on the substantive, economic powers of Congress
and its regulatory agencies.
1-1. THE STATE AcnoIN IssuE PROPERLY FRAMED
Much of the confusion surrounding the FTC's authority to pro-
authority, however, served only to place a congressional imprimatur on the holding of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). In that case the court
held that the Commission's § 6(g) rulemaking authority included the power to promulgate
substantive rules defining both "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair and deceptive
acts or practices." Congress went on to state plainly in the Magnuson-Moss Act that it was
not disturbing any rulemaking authority over "unfair method of competition" that the Com-
mission already had by virtue of National Petroleum Refiners:
The Commission shall have no authority under this subchapter, other than its
authority under this section, to prescribe any rule with respect to unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce. . . . The preceding sentence shall not affect
any authority of the Commission to prescribe rules (including interpretive rules), and
general statements of policy, with respect to unfair methods of competition in or affect-
ing commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
16. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
17. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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hibit anticompetitive state economic regulations is attributable to
the manner in which this legal issue has been framed. One commen-
tator suggests that the key to the inquiry is found in a preemption
analysis based upon the Constitution's supremacy clause.18 The
supremacy clause approach argues that if a congressional intent to
preempt inconsistent state law can be divined in the legislative
history of the FTC Act or its amendments, then the FTC can
preempt or prohibit anticompetitive sovereign state regulations. 9
Proponents of this view further contend that a preemptive congres-
sional intent can be inferred from the legislative history of the
Magnuson-Moss Act,"0 which contains references to the preemptive
effect on conflicting state laws of substantive FTC rules defining
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices."
This reasoning overlooks the basic fact, however, that an in-
quiry into congressional intent, except where necessary to interpret
broad or ambiguous language, is totally unnecessary when the ques-
tion is whether a federal statute preempts a facially inconsistent
state law.21 Congressional intent to preempt is clear from the very
fact of a conflict between the express provisions of the federal and
state statutes. Since the supremacy clause22 preempts any state law
that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," 2 to require further
18. Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DuKE
L.J. 225. See also Note, Parker v. Brown; A Preemption Analysis, 84 YAMZ L.J. 1164 (1975).
19. Professor Verkuil's article focuses upon the Commission's recent proposed rule that
permits druggists to advertise prescription drug prices, despite numerous state laws that
prohibit such advertisements. See Disclosure Regulations Concerning Retail Prices for Pre-
scription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,031 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 447). Professor
Verkuil frames the issue in terms of a search for congressional preemptive intent: "In the final
analysis, the question to be answered remains the same: Did Congress intend to preempt state
laws either through passage of the Sherman Act or the FTCA [FTC Act]?" Verkuil, supra
note 18, at 231.
20. Id. at 240-41.
21. In Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962), Chief Justice Warren quickly dismissed the
contention that Texas community property law took precedence over federal 'regulations
governing survivorship rights in United States treasury bonds. Chief Justice Warren framed
the issue by noting:
The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a
conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the
federal law must prevail. . . .[A]ny state law, however clearly within a State's ac-
knowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield ...
Thus our inquiry is directed toward whether there is a valid federal law, and if so,
whether there is a conflict with state law.
Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
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inquiry once a conflict is demonstrated is to suggest either that
Congress did not really mean what it said or that the supremacy
clause should not be given full effect. A court is unlikely to entertain
seriously either suggestion.
Any doubt that the FTC Act preempts inconsistent state law
was put to rest by the Eighth Circuit in Chamber of Commerce v.
FTC, 1 decided shortly after the FTC Act was enacted. In Chamber
of Commerce the FTC alleged that a grain exchange's restrictive
regulations constituted unfair methods of competition despite a
state statute authorizing the exchange to regulate its members. Re-
jecting the exchange's contention that its conduct was authorized
by state statute and, therefore, immune from federal antitrust scru-
tiny, the Eighth Circuit declared: "Congress, in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, has assumed to legislate concerning 'unfair meth-
ods of competition' . . and if any action. . . has that effect it is
certainly subject to that act, no matter what the state has or has
not authorized or permitted in that respect."
Furthermore, if Congress provides an administrative agency
with substantive rulemaking power, then the agency's substantive
rules should have the same preemptive effect as the underlying
federal statute. No court that has considered the preemptive effect
of substantive agency rules has suggested that a contrary result
should obtain.28 This premise is so obvious that many congressional
spokesmen and witnesses commented during the Magnuson-Moss
debates that the proposed amendments' reaffirmation of the
preemptive effect of FTC substantive rules was totally super-
fluous.Y
24. 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926).
25. Id. at 684. See also Peerless Products, Inc. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959).
26. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (agricultural regulations); Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (federal Pay Board regulations); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962) (treasury regulations); Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958)
(procurement regulations). Professor Verkuil, who suggests that some inquiry is necessary
into whether Congress intended an agency's substantive rules to be preemptive, concedes that
no court has undertaken this inquiry once it determined that an agency's rules had the force
and effect of law. Verkuil, -supra note 18, at 229-30.
27. See Consumer Protection Act of 1970: Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 130-31 (1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin). In a dialogue
with Senator Cook, Harold E. Kohn, a prominent member of the plaintiff antitrust bar,
expressly stated:
At the present time . . . if the Federal Trade Commission Act has a provision which
conflicts with State law, it supersedes State law. . . .If it merely adds something to
give greater protection, then the State law isn't superseded. . . .The same thing applies
today. If it is a regulation under the act, it is a valid regulation. If they seek to make
regulations not under the act, then it is not a valid regulation or the exercise of authority
[Vol. 31:575
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Under traditional supremacy clause analysis, an inquiry into
congressional intent beyond that expressed on the face of a federal
statute is necessary only when the issue is whether Congress in-
tended its statute to occupy an entire regulatory field to the exclu-
sion of non-conflicting or even complementary state laws. In
"occupation of the field" cases, courts frequently resort to an exami-
nation of legislative history in order to determine if the full purposes
and objectives of Congress can be achieved only through exclusive
federal regulation. 28 In the consumer protection field, the
Magnuson-Moss debates clearly demonstrate that Congress did not
intend to preempt nonconflicting state statutes merely by expand-
ing the scope of FTC jurisdiction to include regulation of conduct
"affecting commerce," or by confirming the FTC's substantive rule-
making authority.9
Having recognized that section 5 of the FTC Act preempts con-
flicting state laws, one must then address the altogether different
question of whether sovereign regulatory acts of the state are them-
selves "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" within the meaning of section 5. Of course, the method
used to determine the coverage of the FTC Act, in order to decide
if anticompetitive state actions are prohibited, bears a striking re-
semblance to the "occupation of the field" branch of preemption
analysis-in both instances the language and legislative history of
by the Commission under the act.
Now, today any authority that the Commission exercises under such act to the
extent that it would conflict with the State law would supersede the State law ....
Id. at 122-24. In addition, Professor Milton Handler, a leading opponent of FTC substantive
rulemaking authority, offered a substitute for the section detailing the preemptive effect of
the Magnuson-Moss amendments, which read:
STATE LAWS NOT AFFECTED
SEC. 104. The amendments made by this title shall not affect the jurisdiction of
any court or agdncy of any State or the application of the law of any State with respect
to any matter over which the Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction by reason of
such amendment insofar as such jurisdiction or the application of such law does not
conflict with the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or the exercise of any
authority by the Commission under such Act.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added). This proposed section indicates Professor Handler's position, a
view shared by many commentators, that a legitimate exercise of federal authority by the
Commission preempts conflicting state law.
28. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379
(1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
29. SENAT CoMM. ON CoMMERcE, MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY-FEDERAL TRADE COM-
wssio0 ImPnovEmENT Acr, S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973), in which the
committee stated:
[The Committee was mindful of the danger of making the Commission alone responsi-
ble for eradicating fraud and deceit in every corner of the marketplace. This is not the
Committee's intent in expanding the jurisdiction of the Commission. State and local
consumer protection efforts are not to be supplanted by this expansion of jurisdiction.
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the Act must be examined and, conceivably, so must the language
and history of the Constitution. The resemblance is only superficial,
however. In the determination of the substantive coverage of section
5, legislative history is used to interpret the express language of the
statute; whereas in "occupation of the field" preemption analysis,
legislative history is examined-to determine the broad policy frame-
work within which the express statutory language is designed to
operate.
lI. THm FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT AND ITS RELATION TO
SOVEREIGN STATE REGULATORY CONDUCT
A. The State Action Doctrine of Parker v. Brown
Whether Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply to the
sovereign regulatory conduct of a state is precisely the issue decided
by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown." At issue in Parker was
a California statute permitting local raisin producers to initiate a
marketing program for the express purpose of collectively restrain-
ing supply in order to maintain higher-than-competitive prices.
Under the statute, a marketing plan agreed upon by a majority of
the local producers was implemented by the state department of
agriculture; and any producer who failed to comply with the pro-
gram was guilty of a misdemeanor. Thus the raisin marketing pro-
gram represented a classic case of concerted action to fix
prices-precisely the type of "restraint of trade""1 forbidden by sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act.32
In a suit to enjoin enforcement of this state statute, a dissenting
producer argued that the regulatory scheme, enacted and adminis-
tered by the state of California, was irnvalid because it conflicted
with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 3s unduly
burdened interstate commerce, and violated the Sherman Act.
Upholding the state program on all three counts, the unanimous
Court declared:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
30. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
31. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
32. At the outset the Court expressly stated that: "We may assume for present purposes
that the California prorate program would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and
made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons,
individual or corporate." 317 U.S. at 350.
33. 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1976).
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activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally substract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attrib-
uted to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by
a state.Y
In brief, the Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply to
official action taken by a state even when that action, as in Parker,
is implemented at the behest of private parties and constitutes a
direct restraint upon competition in interstate commerce. 31
The Court's failure to hold that the Sherman Act preempted
the specific California raisin marketing statute at issue in Parker
does not, of course, indicate that the Sherman Act does not or can-
not preempt conflicting state law. The Parker Court clearly recog-
nized that the Sherman Act proscribes private anticompetitive be-
havior and preempts any state statute that seeks to authorize it:
"True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful. . . ... To support this proposition, the Court
cited Northern Securities Co. v. United States.37 In that case the
defendants argued that, because their holding company had been
organized in compliance with the New Jersey corporation law and
was acting consistently with its charter, the company's business
practices were immune from the Sherman Act. Rejecting this de-
fense, the Court declared:
If the certificate of the incorporation of that company hadexpressly stated that
the object of the company was to destroy competition between competing,
parallel lines of interstate carriers, all would have seen, at the outset, that the
scheme was in hostility to the national authority, and that there was a purpose
to violate or evade the act of Congress.u
Thus the Parker Court clearly distinguished a state statute that is
merely permissive of private anticompetitive conduct from one that
actually substitutes a policy of governmental regulation for the free-
market policy of the federal antitrust laws. The former statute is
preempted by the Sherman Act's prohibition of private anticom-
petitive behavior, while the latter enactment represents a sovereign
34. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
35. At the time Parker was decided, California produced nearly one half of the world's
raisins, and between 90 and 95 percent of all California raisins were shipped in interstate
commerce. Id. at 345.
36. Id. at 351.
37. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
38. 317 U.S. at 345.
19781
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
governmental decision not prohibited by the Sherman Act.39
The Parker Court also made plain that neither states nor their
agents are immune from the Sherman Act merely by reason of their
status as sovereigns. Citing Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United
States,"0 in which the Court upheld an injunction restraining a city
from participating in a scheme to grant illegal concessions to a
railroad,41 the Parker Court declared that "we have no question of
the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade.
This view was reiterated in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 3 the Supreme Court's most recent application
of the state action principle to a Sherman Act challenge. In City of
Lafayette an investor-owned utility filed an antitrust counterclaim
charging a municipally owned competitor with various violations of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The district court dismissed the
counterclaim on the ground that Parker immunizes all state or mu-
nicipal conduct from the antitrust laws.4 On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the dismissal45 and the Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals decision.
Relying once again on Union Pacific, the Supreme Court held
that a municipality's conduct, like that of any other antitrust de-
fendant, is subject to the proscriptions of the antitrust laws, unless
that conduct complies with a sovereign state governmental policy
designed to displace competition with regulation." In so holding,
City of Lafayette should put to rest the notion that Parker merely
held that state officials are immune from antitrust suits47 or that
39. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme
Court Term-1977, 77 CoLurm. L. Rav. 979, 1005 (1977); Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Current Attack].
40. 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
41. The city was accused of violating the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1970). The
Act's price discrimination provisions governing the railroad industry resemble the Robinson-
Patman amendments to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
42. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
43. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
44. 532 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1976).
45. Id. at 436.
46. The Supreme Court stated: "We therefore conclude that the Parker doctrine ex-
empts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regula-
tion or monopoly public service." 98 S. Ct. at 1137.
47. Id. at 1136-37. Interestingly, Justice Stevens, who concurred in the Court's City of
Lafayette opinion, maintained earlier in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976),
that Parker's protection was limited to state officials.
[Vol. 31:575
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Parker grants states and their agents a license to disregard the anti-
trust laws when pursuing proprietary commercial activity. 8
While Parker is the case most often cited in support of the
Sherman Act's inapplicability to sovereign state regulatory acts,
Parker was not the first case to reach this conclusion. As early as
1895, a South Carolina federal circuit court held in Lowenstein v.
Evans" that the Sherman Act did not prohibit a state-operated
liquor monopoly. In 1904, almost four decades before Parker, the
Supreme Court held in Olsen v. Smith5 that the Sherman Act did
not apply to a state licensing scheme for river boat pilots. The
Lowenstein, Olsen, and Parker trilogy illustrate the three tradi-
tional methods employed by states to supplant competition with
governmental regulation: state-owned and operated monopolies,
state licensing, and direct state supervision of private decisionmak-
ing.51 Thus these cases confirmed that the Sherman Act leaves a
state free to choose from among these alternatives.
More important, Lowenstein, Olsen and Parker are not aberra-
tions or results that limit the state action doctrine to the Sherman
Act. Rather, the results in these cases rest firmly on the historical.
English common-law tolerance of commercial regulation by the sov-
ereign within a reasonably well-developed law of trade restraints.12
As the Supreme Court observed in Munn v. Illinois53-many years
before the passage of the Sherman Act:
48. As a sequel to its City of Lafayette holding that local governments are not automati-
cally immune from antitrust attack, the Court recently remanded for further consideration
three other challenges to anticompetitive municipal conduct. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n v. City of
Fairfax, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977),judgment vacated, 98 S. Ct. 1642 (1978); City of Impact
v. Whitworth, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977),judgment vacated, 98 S. Ct. 1642 (1978); Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist. v. Kurek, 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), judgment vacated, 98 S. Ct.
1642 (1978). The issue that must now be addressed in each of these cases is whether the city's
conduct is part of a Parker-protected scheme to substitute economic regulation for the self-
regulatory forces of a free market, or whether the city merely acted anticompetitively, for
whatever purpose, in an otherwise unregulated market. If the latter, antitrust liability would
attach.
49. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
50. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
51. See Current Attack, supra note 39, at 8.
52. Id. at 3. Professor Robert H. Bork, however, argues in his recent book, R. BoRK, THE
ATrmnusr PARADOX: A PoLic AT WAa wrm ITsm (1978), that the English common law of
trade restraints was neither well-developed nor internally consistent, and that it had little to
do with the policies or design of the Sherman Act.
53. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). -1.
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[I]t has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this coun-
try from its first colonization, [for the sovereign] to regulate ferries, common
carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so
doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommo-
dations furnished, and articles sold."
The constitutional doctrine of federalism bound the Parker
Court to acknowledge that a state is entitled to the dignity of a
sovereign- s Federalism, therefore, compelled the conclusion that,
absent the expression of congressional intent to the contrary, the
Sherman Act does not comprehend state action. Thus Parker's con-
clusion is founded not only on the Sherman Act but also on the
Anglo-American common law and the Constitution.
B. The Application of the Parker Doctrine to the Federal Trade
Commission Act
Some commentators have suggested that since Parker was de-
cided under the Sherman Act, its reasoning is not applicable to the
FTC Act. The Fourth Circuit did not draw this distinction, how-
ever, when given the opportunity to do so in Asheville Tobacco
Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC.57 In that case, the Commission invoked
section 5 to challenge local tobacco board regulations that restricted
the selling time allocated to each warehouse. A North Carolina stat-
ute, however, authorized these local boards, composed solely of
warehousemen, to use their own discretion in regulating selling
time. On the basis of this statute, the Asheville Board asserted that
its regulations were protected state action. The Fourth Circuit char-
acterized the issue as "whether the activities of tobacco boards of
trade . . [fall] within the rule of Parker v. Brown.""8 After exam-
ining the provisions of the North Carolina statute, the court found
that the statute did not substitute a sovereign regulatory scheme for
private competitive business decisions. Instead, the state statute
simply granted to private warehousemen the right to allocate selling
time independently among themselves without the fear of govern-
mental interference or sanction. Accordingly, the court rejected the
board's state action defense and echoing the Supreme Court's direc-
54. Id. at 125.
55. As Chief Justice Stone declared: "In a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally sub-
tract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
56. See Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 89 HAv. L. Rlv. 715 (1976).
57. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
58. Id. at 508.
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tive in Parker, asserted that: "A state can neither authorize individ-
uals to perform acts which violate the antitrust laws nor declare that
such action is lawful." 59
In a further attempt to distinguish the FTC Act from the Sher-
man Act, it has been urged that sound policy considerations de-
mand that the FTC Act apply to the sovereign regulatory conduct
of a state." It is argued that, because the FTC's remedies are pro-
spective only and the FTC Act does not include a private treble
damage sanction, enforcement of federal antitrust policy by the
FTC does not pose the same threat to federalism that the Court
perceived in Parker." It is also asserted that the FTC Act was de-
signed to reach conduct not comprehended by the Sherman or Clay-
ton Acts, and that the regulation of state action represents an ap-
propriate and desirable use of the Commission's expertise as an
arbiter of trade regulation policy. 2
But on closer examination, these appeals to policy do not sus-
tain their burden. The absence of a treble damages provision in the
FTC Act has no bearing upon the concerns expressed by the Court
in Parker. The Parker case was brought in a court of equity where
treble damages would not have been awarded even if plaintiff had
sought them.3 To the contrary, the key to Parker is its recognition
of a state's right to regulate, not just the state's right to be free from
money damages. Moreover, the argument that Parker's holding is
limited to the concept of state immunity from Sherman Act sanc-
tions"' does not square with Parker's reliance upon Olsen, in which
the state action immunity from Sherman Act penalties was ex-
tended to private defendants. Neither does it square with City of
Lafayette, which held that a city's status as a politial subdivision
59. Id. at 511.
60. Note, supra note 56, at 732-36.
61. This same concern for the potential of a treble damage sanction moved Justice
Blackmun to dissent from the Court's City of Lafayette decision declaring: "It is a grave act
to make governmental units potentially liable for massive treble damages when, however
'proprietary' some of their activities may seem, they have fundamental responsibilities to
their citizens for the provision of life.sustaining services such as police and fire protection."
98 S. Ct. at 1152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Note, supra note 56, at 736-37.
63. In the trial court, Brown sought an injunction against enforcement of the California
Agricultural Prorate Act, alleging that the Act was an illegal interference with, and an undue
burden on, interstate commerce. A three-judge federal district court granted the injunction
solely on the basis of these allegations. The parties did not address the Sherman Act claim
until requested to do so by the Supreme Court on its own motion for reargument. Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1976) (Stevens, J., for a plurality).
64. Id. at 591-92. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens, relying on excerpts from the
Parker briefs, asserted that Parker is limited to a holding of immunity for official action taken
by state officials. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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of the state, without more, does not confer antitrust immunity.
In order to regulate economic activity, a state must be able to
command the acquiescence of the private sector in the state's eco-
nomic policies. It would be anomalous to argue that a state may,
with impunity, impose anticompetitive economic regulations upon
the business community, but that the individual businessmen who
act in compliance with these regulations must respond in damages
to injured competitors. 5 Even more anomalous, however, is the as-
sertion that a prospective, remedial action taken by the FTC
against an anticompetitive state economic regulation would not
constitute exactly the type of interference with state sovereignty
that Parker found to be a violation of federalism in the context of a
private injunctive action brought under the Sherman Act. If any-
thing, enforcement of the FTC Act offers even greater opportunity
for interference with state sovereignty, because the FTC Act prohib-
its an even broader range of conduct than either the Sherman or the
Clayton Acts. 6
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, it also has been sug-
gested that because the Commission is expert in matters of trade
regulation policy, its judgments will best harmonize the twin poli-
cies of a competitive national economy and state regulation of local
activity. 7 But while the Commission is clearly an expert arbiter of
federal trade regulation policy, and although its judgments may
well be superior to those of the various states, the clear implication
of Parker is that federalism preserves the freedom of the states to
supplant the national policy of unrestrained competition with state
regulation, absent a clear congressional statement to the contrary.
Viewed in this light, the conclusion is inescapable that the policy
underlying Parker applies with equal vigor to the FTC Act.
65. In his vigorous Cantor dissent, Justice Stewart severely criticized Justice Stevens'
plurality view that Parker is limited to Sherman Act immunity for state officials:
The plurality opinion would hold that [Parker] decided only that "the sovereign State
itself"... could not be sued under the Sherman Act. This view of Parker, which would
trivialize the case to the point of overruling it, flies in the face of the decisions of this
Court that have interpreted or applied Parker's "state action" doctrine, and is unsup-
ported by the sources on which the plurality relies.
428 U.S. at 616-17. In the accompanying footnote, Justice Stewart adds: "If Parker v. Brown,
supra, could be circumvented by the simple expedient of suing the private party against
whom the State's 'anticompetitive' command runs, then that holding would become an
empty formalism, standing for little more than the proposition that Porter Brown sued the
wrong parties." 428 U.S. at 616-17 n.4.
66. Note, supra note 56, at 733-34.
67. Id. at 737.
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IV. THE CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING Parker-PROTECTED STATE ACTON
A. The Application of Parker Applies When There Is a Clear State
Policy To Supplant Free Competition with State-Supervised
Regulation
Parker was not the last decision in which the Supreme Court
or one of the lower federal courts had an opportunity to examine the
ambit of the state action exemption. These subsequent cases, how-
ever, have neither added to nor subtracted from the rule of law
announced in Parker-that state action is not subject to the Sher-
man Act. Instead, these cases have focused solely on a delineation
of a satisfactory test for identifying sovereign regulatory acts.
Parker's progeny have isolated two indicia necessary for the exist-
ence of protected state action: (1) a clear state policy to supplant
competition; and (2) state supervision of the scheme chosen to re-
place the rules of the marketplace. Unless both these requirements
are met, the state regulation at issue will be subjected to Sherman
Act scrutiny.
In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.," for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute that al-
lowed a manufacturer to enforce a resale price-maintenance agree-
ment against every wholesaler or retailer to whom he sold his prod-
uct, so long as at least one such wholesaler or retailer signed the
agreement. While the Louisiana statute clearly reflected a state
policy to supplant free competition, and thus met the first criterion
of state action, the second requirement was not met because there
was no state supervision of the resale price-maintenance scheme.
After concluding that Louisiana's statute merely authorized private
parties to engage in price-fixing-conduct clearly proscribed by the
Sherman Act"'-the Court invalidated the law under the supremacy
clause.70
68. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
69. E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
70. The same analysis dictated the result in Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d
673 (8th Cir. 1926), and Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1959). See text accompanying notes 24-25 & 56-58 supra. In both cases, a state statute merely
authorized local agricultural exchanges to regulate their own affairs. There was no state
involvement in any of the subsequent anticompetitive rules adopted by the respondents. In
each case, the absence of any state supervision was fatal to the exchanges' state action
defense. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966) (Parker applies when the state approves rates established by a board of private insur-
ance companies). Allstate suggests that so long as some state supervision is present, Parker
will apply even when the initial decision, as in Asheville, is made solely by private parties.
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More recently, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar," a state bar
association's fee schedules were challenged in a private treble dam-
age action brought under the Sherman Act. The state bar argued
that the fee schedules were ancillary to the lawyer disciplinary rules
established by the Virginia Supreme Court, and therefore were pro-
tected state action. The Supreme Court, however, could not identify
any state statute or state supreme court rule or decision that sanc-
tioned lawyer price-fixing. 2 Hence the first criterion was not met.
Having found no protected state action, the Supreme Court held
that the fee schedules were subject to the Sherman Act.
Chief Justice Burger noted in Goldfarb, however, that the
Court's decision should not be read to imply that a state lacked
power to restrain lawyer competition in the exercise of its sovereign
authority:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries .... We also recognize that in some
instances the State may decide that "forms of competition usual in the busi-
ness world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession."...
In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach
of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to
regulate its professions.n
These principles in no way were altered by the Supreme Court's
1976 decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Company.74 In Cantor, a
retail druggist challenged a light bulb exchange program offered by
a state-regulated utility company on the grounds that the program
was an illegal tying arrangement. The challenged program was part
of a rate tariff which, pursuant to state statute, had been filed with
the state public service commission. The program could not be
abandoned until the utility filed a new tariff, which likewise would
71. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
72. Chief Justice Burger declared:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action
of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is
required by the State acting as sovereign .... Here we need not inquire further into
the state-action question because it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia
through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either res-
pondent. Respondents have pointed to no Virginia statute requiring their activities....
421 U.S. at 790. The lack of any anticompetitive state policy also mandated the result in
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). There
a state-employed architect was charged with conspiracy to secure state adoption of pool
specifications that excluded the plaintiff and many of the defendant's other competitors. The
First Circuit was unable to identify any state policy to supplant free competition, and thus
held that the architect was not entitled to Parker protection despite his status as a state
employee.
73. 421 U.S. at 792-93.
74. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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require state approval. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected
the utility's state action defense, finding that the relevant state
statute, which clearly supplanted free competition in the sale of
electricity with a state-supervised scheme of regulation, was silent
regarding the sale of light bulbs. Since the state policy concerning
light bulb sales was "neutral," if not procompetitive, there was no
state policy that met the first criterion. 75 Therefore, the Court found
that the light bulb exchange program was not "state" but only
"private" action and thus fully subject to the Sherman Act.76
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent City of Lafayette decision
demonstrates that unless the governmental conduct at issue meets
both criteria, it is not exempt from the antitrust laws. Thus, City
of Lafayette shows that Parker, and the principles of federalism
from which it is derived, do not protect all governmental acts, but
merely those that are reserved exclusively to sovereigns-such as
the expenditure of public monies, or the decision to supplant free
competition in a local market with a scheme of governmental regu-
lation. Hence, if a state, by itself or through its agents, does not
choose to supplant competition, but merely chooses to compete, for
75. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens stated:
The distribution of electric light bulbs in Michigan is unregulated. The statute
creating the Commission contains no direct reference to light bulbs. Nor, as far as we
have been advised, does any other Michigan statute authorize regulation of that busi-
ness. . . . The Commission's approval of respondents decision to maintain such a pro-
gram does not, therefore, implement any statewide policy relating to light bulbs.
428 U.S. at 584-85. In his Cantor concurrence, Chief Justice Burger, the author of the Court's
Goldfarb opinion, stressed that Justice Stevens' conclusion, quoted above, was all that was
necessary to decide the Cantor case, assuming Justice Stevens was correct. Thus, in his view,
the plurality's effort to limit Parker to antitrust immunity for state officers was inappropriate:
I do not agree, however, that Parker v. Brown . . . can logically be limited to suits
against state officials. . . . There was no need in Parker to focus upon the situation
where the State, in addition to requiring a public utility "to meet regulatory criteria
insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers,". . also purports, without any
independent regulatory purpose, to control the utility's activities in separate, competi-
tive markets. . . . To find a "state action" exemption on the basis of Michigan's undif-
ferentiated sanction of this ancillary practice could serve no federal or state policy.
428 U.S. at 603.05.
76. The Supreme Court's analysis in Cantor should be compared with that of the
Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971). There, a competing gas company challenged an electric utility's promotional
practice of offering free underground wire installation to consumers who chose electric over
gas appliances. The utility's promotional plan was filed with the State Corporation Commis-
sion and became effective when the Commission took no steps to disapprove it. The relevant
state statute clearly authorized the Commission to regulate electric utility promotions. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that since the statute reflected a state regulatory policy, and the
conduct required was ultimately subject to governmental control, the challenged conduct was
Parker-protected, regardless of how aggressively the state actually exercised its supervisory
role. See also Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971) (utility's
promotional plan that was affirmatively sanctioned by the state was protected by Parker).
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whatever public purpose, it must observe the antitrust laws like any
other competitor. In short, proprietary or commercial acts, though
done by a constitutional sovereign, enjoy no exemption from the
antitrust laws, nor are any enabling statutes permitting such con-
duct immune from the automatic preemptive effect of the suprem-
acy clause.
B. The Cantor-Implied "Balancing Test" Rejected: Bates v. State
Bar
Despite the Court's consistent adherence to the two state action
criteria set forth above, attempts have been made to extrapolate
from the Court's Cantor opinion new limitations and restrictions on
the basic rule of law announced in Parker. These efforts stem in
large measure from Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Cantor, in
which he suggested that a "rule of reason" approach should be used
to assess the justification for state regulatory schemes, similar to the
test used in the traditional equal protection review." Justice Black-
mun's argument seems to endorse Professor Slater's earlier sugges-
tion78 that a "balancing test" should be applied as a third criterion
to restrict the scope of the Parker state action exemption. This
balancing approach would further require that a state regulatory
scheme be reasonably and rationally related to the policies it pur-
ports to promote.
Such a balancing test has no place in the state action doctrine,
however, because it does not address the only constitutionally sig-
nificant issue-whether the activity under review is sovereign regu-
latory conduct not subject to antitrust proscription. In fact, the
balancing test can operate only under the assumption that the un-
derlying state regulatory conduct is necessarily subject to the anti-
trust laws, an assumption not permitted by the Parker rationale2.
77. Some of this interpretive difficulty associated with Justice Blackmun's Cantor con-
currence can be traced to the manner in which he framed the issue:
I also agree with MR. Jusric. STmVs that the particular anticompetitive scheme
attacked in this case must fall despite the imprimatur it claims to have received from
the State of Michigan. To say, as I have, that the Sherman Act generally pre-empts
inconsistent state laws is not to answer the much more difficult question as to which
such laws are pre-empted and to what extent.
428 U.S. at 609. He then went on to announce his unique "rule of reason" test: "I would apply,
at least for now, a rule of reason. . . . I would assess the justifications of such enactments
in the same way as is done in equal protection review, and where such justifications are at
all substantial ... I would be reluctant to find the restraint unreasonable." 428 U.S. at 610-
11.
78. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw. L. Rlv. 71, 104-08 (1974).
79. Even Professor Slater, the herald of Cantor's "balancing test," agrees that it is
contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Parker:
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Furthermore, the Cantor balancing test not only erroneously pre-
sumes that state action is subject to antitrust scrutiny, but also
mistakenly imports into federal commerce power analysis a four-
teenth amendment test designed to determine whether state action
comports with the commands of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses.80 Thus, this approach ignores the fact that applicabil-
ity of the federal commerce power to state action is governed by a
completely different set of standards than those governing the ap-
plicability of the fourteenth amendment.8 '
Moreover, this balancing test leads to the equally erroneous
conclusion that an unconstitutional state economic regulatory
scheme can be attacked as a "restraint of trade" violative of the
antitrust laws. But proof that a state regulatory scheme is unconsti-
tutional establishes only that the scheme is an impermissible exer-
cise of sovereign regulatory authority, not that the scheme was pri-
vate or state proprietary conduct that might violate the antitrust
laws.
This distinction between unconstitutional state regulation and
"state action" that violates the antitrust laws is central to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar.82 In Bates, a unani-
mous Court dispelled all doubts that Cantor had generated about
the continuing vitality of the Parker doctrine. Writing on behalf of
the Bates Court, Justice Blackmun, the architect of the Cantor
balancing test, implicitly withdrew his support of Professor Slater's
The approach actually adopted in Parker, however, is not one of balancing the import-
ance of the state policy against the injury to competition. A fair reading of the case
indicates that the Court believes that the Sherman Act, and its policy in favor of
competition, do not apply to state action taken in pursuit of public policy goals, no
matter how weak the public goals or how serious the injury to competition.
Id. at 91.
80. Indeed, an "interest balancing" yardstick is traditionally employed by the Court
to determine the validity of state action under the due process or equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But the Court
has rejected all scrutiny of state economic regulation under the "substantive due process"
branch of the fourteenth amendment. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Nevertheless,
all state action must comport with every relevant constitutional provision that applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, as well as with the commerce clause. See, e.g.,
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424
U.S. 366 (1976); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
81. In order to meet the threshold jurisdictional requirement for fourteenth amendment
scrutiny the conduct at issue must be "state action." See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972) (fourteenth amendment did not apply to a private shopping center's antipicketing
rules because the restrictions were not state action). On the other hand, as National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), makes plain, certain "state action" is constitutionally
exempt from the federal commerce power.
82. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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third criterion and reaffirmed the vitality of Parker.
Bates arose in the context of a disciplinary proceeding against
two lawyers who violated an Arizona Supreme Court injunction
against lawyer advertising. The lawyer-appellants, relying on
Goldfarb and Cantor, challenged the disciplinary action in a state
court, asserting that the state bar association's rules, as adopted
and enforced by the Arizona Supreme Court, violated the Sherman
Act. On appeal from an Arizona Supreme Court decision that im-
posed modified sanctions against the appellants, the United States
Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' Sherman Act defense.
The Court noted that the advertising ban reflected a sovereign state
policy to restrict lawyer competition83 and that the Arizona Su-
preme Court supervised the ban through its participation in disci-
plinary procedures such as those instituted against the appellants.'4
On this basis alone the Court held that the state bar association's
lawyer advertising ban was sovereign regulatory action immune to
antitrust attack.'5
Employing the fourteenth amendment, the Bates Court then
went on to invalidate Arizona's ban on lawyer advertising as an
infringement upon plaintiff's first amendment right of commercial
free speech.8 But this constitutional holding played no part in the
Court's Sherman Act analysis. No balancing test was utilized and
no antitrust liability was found or even suggested.87 Thus, Bates
83. Justice Blackmun stated: "In the instant case. . . the challenged restraint is the
affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court .. .. [Tihus, the restraint is
'compelledby direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' "Id. at 359.60.
84. Justice Blackmun further noted that the State Bar acts as the Arizona Supreme
Court's supervised agent in enforcing that court's rules: "Although the State Bar plays a part
in the enforcement of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the appellee acts
as the agent of the court under its continuous supervision." Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
85. The appellants contended that the Arizona advertising ban failed the so-called
"balancing test" because the state's interest in regulating the bar was not outweighed by the
federal intereit embodied in the Sherman Act. Id. at 360-61. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, however, by citing Goldfarb's assertion that a state's regulatory interest in the practice
of professions is beyond peradventure. Id. at 360 n.11. There was no mention of a countervail-
ing federal interest in free competition.
86. Id. at 363-82.
87. It has been suggested, however, that since Cantor, two courts ostensibly have ap-
plied a balancing test-the Ninth Circuit in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549
F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977), and the Eastern District of Virginia in
Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977). But it
should be noted that neither case actually supports a balancing test. The issue in Boddicker
was whether the practice of dentistry was a learned profession exempt from the antitrust laws.
Citing Goldfarb, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not. In Surety Title, while the court
purportedly undertook a balancing test, the issue was whether a Virginia bar association's
opinion regarding the unauthorized practice of law shielded the defendant's anticompetitive
conduct. The bar association's opinion, however, had no greater claim to state action immun-
ity than the fee schedules in Goldfarb; and thus a balancing test was unnecessary to a finding
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confirms that the Supreme Court's adherence to Parker and the
doctrine of federalism remains as vigorous today as in 1943. Indeed,
the recent City of Lafayette decision provides final although per-
haps unnecessary reassurance of the continued vitality of the Parker
state action doctrine: "Parker and its progeny make clear that a
State properly may, as States did in Parker and Bates, direct or
authorize its instrumentalities to act in a way which, if it did not
reflect state policy, would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws.""8
C. A Factual Inquiry Is Mandated To Determine the Applicability
of the Twin Parker Criteria
The preceding analysis is not meant to suggest, however, that
the Commission should abandon its campaign against anticompeti-
tive regulatory conduct that is only thinly cloaked with the mantle
of the state. Quite to the contrary, the twin criteria of state ac-
tion-a clear state policy to supplant competition and adequate
state supervision-are not conclusions to be reached as a matter of
law, but rather are factual determinations. When a state action
defense is raised before a court or the FTC, each of those tribunals
is clearly entitled to look behind the pleadings to determine if a
sovereign state policy to supplant free competition actually exists
and whether the state is in fact supervising it. The Court remanded
City of Lafayette and three similar cases to the trial court for pre-
cisely this type of factual examination."9
In addition, it would appear that this was the basis for the
Ninth Circuit's remand of the Commission's challenge in California
v. FTC." In that case, a California statute authorized the formation
of a Milk Advisory Board composed of industry members appointed
by the governor.' In conjunction with the state agriculture depart-
ment, the advisory board was empowered to disseminate advertise-
ments encouraging public consumption of milk as a generic com-
modity. Another section of the statute, however, prohibits adver-
of liability. Moreover, both courts explicitly qualified their opinions by adverting to Bates.
See 549 F.2d at 631 n.6; 431 F. Supp. at 309.
88. 98 S. Ct. at 1139.
89. The Court's remand of this case raises the spectre of treble damages. This concern
prompted Justice Blackmun to dissent in City of Lafayette. See note 60 supra. The City of
Lafayette plurality rejected this consideration, noting that the issue of remedy would become
relevant only after the district court had found that the defendants actually violated the
antitrust laws. 98 S. Ct. at 1131 n.22. It may well be, however, that an argument based upon
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will preserve municipal treasuries from the threat per-
ceived by Justice Blackmun.
90. 549 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
91. Marketing Act of 1937, CAL. Foon & Aomc. Corm §§ 58601-59293 (West).
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tisements that are unfair or misleading.2 Pursuant to this statute,
and under the aegis of both the Advisory Board and the state de-
partment of agriculture, an advertisement .was issued urging that
milk be consumed in unlimited quantities.
Because medical evidence suggests that unrestricted milk con-
sumption might actually injure public health, the Commission
commenced an administrative proceeding to ban this advertisement
as "unfair and deceptive" under the FTC Act. The Advisory Board
brought an action in federal district court to enjoin the Commis-
sion's proceeding, arguing that, as a state agency, the Parker doc-
trine placed it beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. The district
court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that because the
Board was a state agency, the FTC probably lacked jurisdiction as
a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court and
remanded the case to the Commission, holding that the FTC is
entitled to hold a factual hearing on the question of its subject
matter jurisdiction.94
City of Lafayette makes plain the fact that the Board's mere
status as a state agency will not shield it from the Commission's
jurisdiction. Indeed, because the state statute specifically prohibits
false and misleading advertisements, the Commission may well find
that no state policy supplants the federal policy embodied in the
FTC Act, and that, therefore; the Board's conduct is subject to the
sanctions of the FTC Act."
Furthermore, should the Commission eventually enjoin the
Board's advertisement, the factual setting presents an excellent
example of how the FTC can employ its broad substantive powers
to prevent an offensive trade practice'that is neither a traditional
antitrust violation nor state action, without exposing the offending
party to the devastation of treble damages. This is precisely the role
Congress had in mind for the Commission-to deal flexibly with
92. Id. at § 58889.
93. California v. FTC, 1974-2 TRmE CASES (CCH) 1 75,328 (N.D. Cal.). The district
court asserted that whether the FTC had jurisdiction over the advisory board depended upon
whether the board is a "person," "partnership," or "corporation" as defined by the FTC Act.
The court then cited Parker v. Brown for the proposition that the FTC was probably without
jurisdiction to proceed against the Board. Id. at 98,039. In framing the issue in this manner,
the court mistakenly construed Parker to hold that a state's mere status as a sovereign
exempts its conduct from antitrust scrutiny. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
94. The court held that the plaintiffs' suit to enjoin the FTC proceeding was not ripe
because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The court went on
to state that "a full factual development is an essential prerequisite for determining the
Parker v. Brown issue." 549 F.2d at 1325.
95. The case would stand in the same posture as George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). See note 71 supra.
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pernicious trade practices not otherwise subject to attack by the
Justice Department or private parties through court enforcement of
the Sherman or Clayton Acts."8
V. THE Parker PRINCIPLE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DocmRINE: National
League of Cities v. Usery
The Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether Congress,
through the use of the commerce power, could amend the Sherman
or FTC Acts to include state action within the coverage of the Acts
or to prohibit certain sovereign state policy choices affecting inter-
state commerce. The Parker Court expressly reserved this question
declaring: "We may assume also, without deciding, that Congress
could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from
maintaining a stabilization program like the present because of its
effect on interstate commerce."" The answer to this constitutional
issue, however, may well have been foreshadowed in National
League of Cities v. Usery1
The question presented in Usery was whether the 1974 exten-
sion of the Fair Labor Standards Act's99 minimum wage provisions
to nearly all state and local governmental employees ® was a consti-
tutional exercise of the commerce power. In an opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, a divided Court"0' held that, even though the
wages of state and local governmental employees affected interstate
commerce, the application of the federal minimum wage statute to
these wages transgressed an affirmative constitutional limitation on
the federal commerce power. The constitutional limitation recog-
nized in Usery preserves the sanctity of a sovereign state policy
decision, even though that decision conflicts with a federal mandate
governing the private sector. In so holding, the Court explicitly over-
ruled its 1968 decision in Maryland v. WirtzI 2 that had upheld a
similar application of the federal minimum wage statute to state
school and hospital employees.
Like the Parker decision, Usery's result is not a consequence of
96. See Verkuil, supra note 18, at 234.
97. 317 U.S. at 350.
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 557 (1970).
100. The only state or local government personnel exempted from the 1974 version of
the Act are executive, administrative, or professional employees, as well as public officehold-
ers and their staffs. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(2)(C), 213(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
101. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Stewart and Powell, and Chief Justice
Burger. Justice Blackmun concurred separately. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Jus-
tices White and Marshall. Justice Stevens dissented separately.
102. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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preemption analysis. At the outset of his opinion Justice Rehnquist
carefully points out that the issue in Usery is not federal preemption
of an inconsistent state law:
Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may
pre-empt express state law determinations contrary to the result which has
commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to be
limited only by the requirement that "the means chosen by [Congress] must
be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."'
'
Nor was the issue in Usery whether the state statute or regulatory
scheme affected interstate commerce. The interstate commerce
nexus in both cases was clear: in Parker, the state-created program
affected large quantities of raisins that moved in interstate com-
merce; and in Usery, the wages paid to state and municipal employ-
ees also affected interstate commerce."'4 Rather than assessing the
effect of the Fair Labor Standards Act on interstate commerce, the
Court interpreted the scope of an affirmative constitutional limita-
tion on the federal commerce power:
Appellants in no way challenge.., the breadth of authority granted
Congress under the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, is that
when Congress seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public
employers, it transgresses an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power
akin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained in the Consti-
tution.1'
The Usery Court resolved this legal issue in a fashion similar,
if not identical, to the approach taken in Parker. Implicit in Parker
was a recognition of the states' sovereign right, grounded in Anglo-
American common law, to regulate local commerce; ' Usery, too,
explicitly recognized the long-standing sovereignty of the states:
Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution.
The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by
substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon
the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers,
greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in many articles of the Constitu-
tion the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the
independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized."'1
But, the proposition that some forms of state action are consti-
tutionally protected from Congress' exercise of its plenary constitu-
103. 426 U.S. at 840, quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 262 (1964).
104. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (local wages affect interstate
commerce).
105. 426 U.S. at 841.
106. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
107. 426 U.S. at 844, quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S: (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).
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tional powers is not unique to Usery. The same view was expressed
in New York v. United States,"' in which Chief Justice Stone, the
author of the Parker opinion, declared on behalf of four concurring
members of the Court that Congress cannot tax states in the same
fashion as private individuals:
A State may, like a private individual, own real property and receive
income. But in view of our former decisions we could hardly say that a general
non-discriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or an income tax laid upon
citizens and States alike could be constitutionally applied to the State's capi-
tol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from
taxes or school lands, even though all real property and all income of the
citizen is taxed.'"
While a state's limited constitutional exemption from the fed-
eral taxing power is well recognized,110 a similar exemption from the
federal commerce power has never been explicitly rejected. Admit-
tedly, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the same statute challenged
in Usery, was upheld in United States v. Darby"' as a valid exercise
of the commerce power. Moreover, the Court in Darby rejected the
defendant's claim that the real target of the Act, regulation of local
labor conditions, was reserved to the control of the states by the
tenth amendment.112 Darby, however, does not represent the denial
of a state sovereignty exemption from the commerce power. The
1941 version of the Fair Labor Standards Act addressed only private
conduct, and the defendant's labor contracts in Darby had no
connection to the state whatsoever. Thus, the defendant's tenth
amendment defense had less force than if the state itself had been
the proponent, and his only colorable claims were based upon other
constitutional provisions and upon the assertion that the private
conduct the Fair Labor Standards Act sought to regulate did not
affect interstate commerce. Chief Justice Stone, for a unanimous
Court, acknowledged that "[w]hatever their motive and purpose,
regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional
108. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
109. Id. at 587-88. The case was decided by an eight-member court. Justice Frank-
furter, who delivered the opinion of the Court (in which only one other justice joined), would
have sanctioned a federal tax on state activity as long as the federal tax did not discriminate
against a state. Id. at 583-84. Justice Frankfurter nevertheless acknowledged that some state
activity, such as maintaining a statehouse, could never be taxed without unjustifiably inter-
fering with state sovereignty. Id. at 582. Most intriguing was the dissenting opinion of Justices
Douglas and Black, who would have found all state activity immune to federal taxation. Id.
at 590-98.
110. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
111. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
112. Id. at 106.
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prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by
the Commerce Clause.
113
He then disposed of the defendant's tenth amendment argu-
ment as follows:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which ... states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declara-
tory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose
was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to
exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise
fully their reserved powers. " '
In brief, the Court in Darby held that when a federal statute meets
all other constitutional requirements and does not infringe upon
state sovereignty, the tenth amendment does not inhibit the opera-
tion of the supremacy clause.
Similarly, Usery is consistent with Chief Justice Stone's earlier
opinion in United States v. California. 5 In California the Federal
Safety Appliance Act"18 was held applicable to a state-owned and
operated railroad. Finding that the state's railroad clearly affected
interstate commerce,117 the Court further noted that application of
the federal statute to the railroad caused no injury to the state's
integrity as a sovereign. Applying the federal statute, the Court
made California's railroad adhere to national safety standards:
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its railroad in
its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That in operating its railroad it is
acting within a power reserved to the states cannot be doubted .... [Tihe
exercise of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the
power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted specifically to
the national government. The sovereign power of the states is necessarily dim-
inished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the
Constitution.1 '8
This observation in United States v. California does not contradict
but rather confirms the conclusions in Parker and Usery. All three
113. Id. at 115.
114. Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
115. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Review of United States v. California and the other precedents
relevant to this section of the Article-Parker, Darby and New York v. United States-reveals
a previously unacknowledged fact: Chief Justice Stone's opinions etched the intricate
twentieth-century relationship between the states and the federal government. With the
overruling of Maryland v. Wirtz, Usery confirmed that the Court today remains true to the
supple principle of federal-state accommodation described by Stone more than a generation
ago.
116. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
117. 297 U.S. at 182-83.
118. Id. at 183.84.
[Vol. 31:575
PARKER AND USERY
cases indicate that the mere status of a state as a sovereign does not
prevent preemption under the supremacy clause and that only a
threat to the constitutionally recognized sovereign activity of a state
can inhibit the application of the federal commerce power."'
The United States v. California holding, however, was central
to the Court's interim decision in Maryland v. Wirtz,10 which Usery
expressly overruled. Like Usery, Wirtz involved the constitution-
ality of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In 1966, Congress amended
the Act to extend the minimum wage provisions to state school and
hospital employees. The appellants in Wirtz contended that the
1966 amendments were not within the commerce power because
Congress was, in effect, telling states how to perform such tradi-
tional state functions as the provision of medical and educational
services. The Court properly discerned that this contention was "not
factually accurate."121 As the Court realized, the 1966 amendments
did no more than tell the states that, in the operation of their
schools and hospitals, they had to pay certain employees a mini-
mum wage. The true vice of the Act, as the Usery Court later recog-
nized, was not that it told states how specifically to administer
schools, hospitals, or other state functions or services, but rather
that it interfered with the states' more basic decisions concerning
the allocation of resources among the various sovereign functions
the states are expected to perform. The Wirtz Court apparently did
not appreciate this distinction, probably because Maryland incor-
rectly framed the issue of infringement. When the Court determined
that Maryland's claim of interference with sovereignty was un-
founded, it disposed of the case on the basis of a mechanical appli-
cation of United States v. California. 1 2 Nevertheless, the Wirtz
Court did note in passing that when interpreting the scope of the
commerce power, the Court "has ample power to prevent what the
appellants purport to fear, 'the utter destruction of the State as a
119. Justice Stone also commented that even if operation of a railroad were a state
function, exempt from federal taxation, and one in which the state traditionally and custom-
arily had engaged, the state still would have to conform its conduct to the federal mandate:
[W]e look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking
the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny
the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.
rd. at 185.
120. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
121. Id. at 193.
122. Justice Harlan stated: "But while the commerce power has limits, valid general
regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is
involved .... This was settled by the unanimous decision in United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175." Id. at 196-97.
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sovereign political entity.' "121 Thus, if the nature of the Act's inter-
ference with Maryland's sovereign right to allocate its resources had
been presented to the Court as clearly as it was later in Usery, the
Court might have sustained Maryland's position.
In any event, the Court did not persist on the errant course set
by Wirtz. Six years later, in Fry v. United States, 12 the Court again
addressed the scope of the affirmative state sovereignty limitation
on the commerce power. In June 1973 President Nixon declared a
national economic emergency and invoked the standby authority
granted him by Congress to impose temporary wage and price con-
trols. 1 Shortly thereafter, a federal Pay Board created by executive
order to set wage-hike restrictions established a seven percent limit
on all salary increases. Seeking to implement a 10.6 percent increase
for state employees, Ohio applied to the Board for an exemption.
Upon the denial of that petition, Fry and another state employee
secured a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court to com-
pel state officials to pay the salary increase.12 The United States
then enjoined enforcement of the mandamus in federal district
court, and on appeal to the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals, the district court's decision was affirmed on the basis of the
Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. California and Wirtz."
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the state
employees urged that although their wages had an effect on inter-
state commerce, the Pay Board's salary freeze was unconstitutional
because, like the federal minimum wage law in Wirtz, the salary
freeze interfered "with sovereign state functions and for that reason
the Commerce Clause should not be read to permit regulation of all
state and local governmental employees."'2 The Court rejected this
argument, finding that a federally ordered temporary wage-freeze
was even less intrusive upon state sovereignty than the federal mini-
mum wage law upheld in Wirtz.121 In dismissing the Fry petition,
however, the Court foreshadowed the later holding in Usery:
Petitioners have stated their argument, not in terms of the Commerce
power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed by the Tenth
Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
123. Id. at 196.
124. 421 U.S. 542 (1974).
125. The President derived his authority from the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976). The President's authority expired on April 30, 1974.
126. State v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N.E.2d 129 (1973).
127. United States v. Ohio, 487 F.2d 936 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied as
to the State of Ohio, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975).
128. 421 U.S. at 547.
129. Id. at 548.
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"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been surren-
dered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.1 0
Only after disposing of the tenth amendment argument did the
Court give preemptive effect to the administrative ruling of the Pay
Board: "Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted with the Pay
Board's ruling, under the Supremacy Clause the State must yield
to the federal mandate.""13 In this respect Fry followed the approach
of the Court's Sherman Act decision in Schwegmann Brothers v.
Calvert Distillers Corp."' In Schwegmann, the supremacy clause
and its mandatory preemptive effect also was called into play when
the Louisiana non-signer resale price-maintenance statute, which
conflicted with the Sherman Act, was found not to rise to the level
of Parker-protected state action.
When placed in its historical context, National League of Cities
v. Usery should be viewed not as an aberration, but rather as the
latest enunciation of the long-recognized principle that the Consti-
tution affirmatively protects the right of states to engage in activi-
ties reserved to them as sovereigns-a principle implicit in New
York v. United States, Darby, United States v. California, Wirtz,
Fry, and, of course, Parker. It also should be stressed that Usery's
result rested not upon a feared impact upon any particular state or
municipal service, but rather upon the extent of encroachment upon
certain state decisions that embody their role as governmental
units.133 Application of the federal statute in Usery would have
stripped the states of their discretion in setting wages. This abridge-
ment of discretion, in turn, would have denied the states the flexi-
bility to make fundamental decisions regarding how local tax mon-
ies and other public resources should be spent.3' For this reason, as
the United States v. California Court had suggested, attempts to
limit this doctrine by distinguishing between the traditional or non-
130. Id. at 547 n.7.
131. Id. at 548.
132. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
133. Justice Rehnquist explicitly stated: "We earlier noted some disagreement between
the parties regarding the precise effect the amendments will have in application. We do not
believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue
presented, however." 426 U.S. at 851.
134. The Usery Court noted: "If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority
to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance




traditional nature of a particular state service affected by a federal
statute are untenable.135
Usery also demonstrates that it is no answer to the infringement
of sovereignty that the impact of the federal statute on the state is
no different from its impact on private employers. Nor is it relevant
that enforced state compliance enhances the achievement of con-
gressional objectives. These arguments cannot save a statute that
directly threatens state sovereignty:
Th[e] dilemma presented by the minimum wage restrictions may seem
not immediately different from that faced by private employers .... The
difference, however, is that a State is not merely a factor in the "shifting
economic arrangements" of the private sector of the economy. . ., but is itself
a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing
our Federal Union."'
It should be stressed that Usery-like Parker and its pro-
geny-did not declare a blanket rule that any federal commerce
statute interfering with a state policy choice is unconstitutional.
Rather, Usery and Parker held only that certain state policy deci-
sions that directly affect a state's ability to carry out its functions
as a sovereign governmental unit are protected from federal com-
merce power interference. A case-by-case factual examination is
required to determine first if the activity challenged is conduct re-
served to states as federally recognized sovereigns and, second,
whether federal intervention will imperil the state's integrity as a
constitutional sovereign.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both Usery and the Parker doctrine rest upon the constitutional
principle that the federal commerce power cannot be exercised in a
fashion that drastically impairs a state's ability to function as a
sovereign in a federal system. Furthermore, as the precedents un-
135. See note 118 supra. One such effort is made by Professor Frank I. Michelman in
his article, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YAa L.J. 1165 (1977). Professor Michelman seizes on the list of
"traditional" governmental functions enumerated in Usery to assert that Usery really pro-
tects the states' role as providers of free public services. Id. at 1172. He goes on to raise the
possibility that since this role of the states is constitutionally protected by Usery, those
citizens for whom the services are intended may, as a result of Usery, have a constitutional
right to receive them. Id. at 1182. There are several flaws in Professor Michelman's analy-
sis-not the least of which is his failure to recognize that the character of the service affected
by the minimum wage law in Usery is irrelevant to the Court's decision. The proper issue in
Usery is whether states shall be free from federal commerce power interference to make
certain economic decisions that fundamentally affect their role as coordinate sovereigns in
the federal system.
136. 426 U.S. at 848-49.
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derlying both Parker and Usery demonstrate, this principle is not
antithetical to the Constitution's supremacy clause. The supremacy
clause merely dictates that when federal and state statutes operate
in the same area, the federal rule overrides that of the state when-
ever there is a direct conflict between the two, or when Congress
determines that the federal rule shall be exclusive. The altogether
different constitutional issue addressed by Parker and Usery is
whether certain state policy choices that form the basic elements of
a state's role as a sovereign can be subordinated to a federal com-
merce power directive.
The Parker doctrine makes plain that Congress intended the
antitrust laws to defer to sovereign state economic regulatory deci-
sions. This deference, therefore, must be paid by both the FTC and
the courts. Nevertheless, the Parker line of cases require that only
conduct pursuant to genuine sovereign state regulatory choices en-
joys antitrust immunity. States are not free to authorize private
anticompetitive conduct, nor to disregard the antitrust laws them-
selves in pursuit of purely commercial objectives.
Similarly, Usery gives explicit constitutional recognition to the
underlying premise of Parker and holds that principles of federalism
prohibit even Congress from using the commerce power to encroach
upon state sovereignty. Thus, by casting Parker in a constitutional
mold, Usery extends Parker's significance far beyond the confines
of antitrust. Consequently, Parker and the twin state-action criteria
identified by its progeny riiark the boundary of state conduct that
is not only immune from the antitrust laws, but also immune from
the federal commerce power.
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